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Abstract:	Kantian	disinterest	is	the	view	that	aesthetic	judgement	is	constituted	(at	least	
in	part)	by	a	form	of	perceptual	contemplation	that	is	divorced	from	concerns	of	practical	
action.	That	view,	which	continues	to	be	defended	to	this	day,	is	challenged	here	on	the	
basis	that	it	is	unduly	spectator-focussed,	ignoring	important	facets	of	art-making	and	its	
motivations.	 Beauty	moves	 us,	 not	 necessarily	 to	 tears	 or	 rapt	 contemplation,	 but	 to	
practical	action;	crucially,	it	may	do	so	as	part	and	parcel	of	its	appreciation.	This	claim	is	
defended	 via	 reflection	 on	 (i)	 the	 art	 of	 photography,	 (ii)	 the	 concepts	 of	 ‘attentional	
salience’	and	‘experienced	mandates’,	and	(iii)	a	virtue-based	account	of	aesthetic	value.1			
	
	
I. Introduction	
Kant’s	 thesis	 of	 aesthetic	 disinterest	 casts	 a	 domineering	 shadow	 over	 contemporary	
aesthetics.	 According	 to	 Kant,	 aesthetic	 judgement	 entails	 pleasure	 in	 an	 object’s	
perceptual	appearance.	This	pleasure	is	said	to	be	‘disinterested’	insofar	as	it	is	free	from	
practical	 interests	 and	 desires.	 (Kant’s	 theory	 is	 most	 often	 discussed	 as	 a	 theory	 of	
beauty.	I	shall	be	rather	liberal	in	my	understanding	of	the	view	and	take	it	as	a	theory	of	
aesthetic	 judgement	 more	 generally.)	 For	 Kant,	 aesthetic	 judgement	 is	 a	 matter	 of	
contemplating	 perceptual	 form,	with	 our	 sensory	 and	 cognitive	 faculties	 operating	 in	
complete	 absorption,	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 all	 else.	 In	 not	 being	 based	 upon	 personal	
interests	or	desires,	this	pleasure	is	not	one	of	idiosyncratic	preference	or	mere	liking,	
what	Kant	calls	 ‘the	agreeable’	 (§3).	Nor	 is	 it	pleasure	 in	a	 thing’s	objective	utility,	 its	
being	 fit	 for	 its	 function,	what	Kant	calls	 ‘the	useful’	 (§4).	Rather,	aesthetic	 judgement	
entails	pleasure	in	a	thing’s	looking	good	(or	sounding	good,	etc.)	purely	for	the	looking	
at	 it	 (or	the	hearing	of	 it,	etc.),	entirely,	 that	 is,	 for	 its	own	sake.	Objects	 that	occasion	
pleasure	 in	 this	 way	 are	 experienced	 as	 if	 made	 not	 just	 for	 the	 viewer’s	 perceptual	
gratification,	but	for	everyone’s.	Kant	writes:	“attached	to	the	judgment	of	taste,	with	the	
consciousness	of	an	abstraction	in	it	from	all	interest,	[is]	a	claim	to	validity	for	everyone”	
(§6).	
	
Close	cousins	of	Kant’s	thesis	are	defended	to	this	day.	Edward	Bullough	(1912),	Clive	
Bell	(1914),	Jerome	Stolnitz	(1960),	Jerrold	Levinson	(1992)	and	Bence	Nanay	(2016)	all	
defend	views	that	draw	inspiration	from	Kant	in	affirming	that	aesthetic	judgement	is,	
necessarily,	free	from	personal	interest	and	idiosyncrasies.	It	is	therefore	entirely	non-
practical	in	character.	Aesthetic	judgement,	for	these	philosophers,	entails	experiencing	
objects	 and	 events	 in	 a	 uniquely	 detached	way.	 Here	 is	 Bell,	motivating	 his	 aesthetic	
formalism	and,	100	years	later,	Nanay,	demarcating	aesthetic	attention:		
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“Those	who	 find	 the	 chief	 importance	 of	 art	 or	 of	 philosophy	 in	 its	 relation	 to	
conduct	or	its	practical	utility…	will	never	get	from	anything	the	best	that	it	can	
give.	Whatever	the	world	of	aesthetic	contemplation	may	be,	it	is	not	the	world	of	
human	business	and	passion;	in	it	the	chatter	and	tumult	of	material	existence	is	
unheard,	or	heard	only	as	the	echo	of	some	more	ultimate	harmony.”	(Bell	1914,	
p.26)	
	
“[T]here	is	a	very	clearly	defined	difference	between	aesthetic	attention	and	non-
aesthetic	attention—one	of	them	is	distributed	across	properties	but	focused	on	
one	 object,	whereas	 the	 other	 one	 is	 not…	 [T]hinking	 of	 aesthetic	 attention	 as	
distributed	attention	does	capture	the	original	Kantian	importance	of	disinterest	
in	our	aesthetic	experiences.	Practical	interest	in	an	object…	could	be	described	as	
attention	focused	on	a	limited	number	of	its	features—the	ones	we	are	interested	
in	from	a	practical	point	of	view.”	(Nanay	2016,	p.26)	
	
	
Kant’s	concept	of	aesthetic	disinterest	contains	idiosyncrasies	of	its	own.	If	aiming	to	be	
accurate	to	Kant,	then	one	should	be	careful	to	keep	his	notion	of	disinterest	distinct	from	
the	views	of	others	(Zangwill	1992;	Crowther	2008,	pp.70-72).	Nonetheless,	the	above	
philosophers	clearly	do	follow	directly	in	Kant’s	footsteps.	We	can	therefore	justifiably	
use	 the	 term	 ‘Kantian	disinterest’	 in	a	stipulative	manner	 to	cover	all	 such	views,	and	
related	ones,	 that	distinguish	what	 goes	on	 in	 the	mind	of	 one	who	 is	 considering	 an	
object	or	event	aesthetically,	with	one	who	is	considering	that	object	or	event	in	a	more	
practical	or	engaged	way,	i.e.	via	the	lens	of	their	personal	interests.			
	
Kantian	 disinterest	 has	 recently	 been	 challenged	 from	 a	 number	 of	 directions.	
Judgements	of	sexiness	may	be	thought	to	be	at	once	aesthetic,	yet	partially	constituted	
by	 the	 judge’s	 practical	 interests,	 i.e.	 sexual	 desires	 (Lintott	&	 Irvin	2016).	Moreover,	
some	encounters	with	beauty	are	significant	not	because	they	cause	one	to	shed	one’s	
idiosyncratic	interests,	values	and	desires,	but	because	they	reveal	and	transform	those	
interests	 (Riggle	 2016).	Kantian	disinterest	 has	 also	been	 challenged	 for	 its	 failure	 to	
acknowledge	conceptual	overlaps	between	the	aesthetic,	the	moral	and	the	social	(Carroll	
1996;	Berleant	2010;	Saito	2016).		
	
All	of	the	above	challenges	focus	on	the	aesthetic	judgements	of	spectators.	I	will	explore	
a	 quite	 different	 problem	 for	 the	 thesis	 of	 Kantian	 disinterest,	 one	 that	 is	 fruitfully	
approached	via	the	notions	of	perceptual	attention	and	salience:	that	it	pays	insufficient	
attention	to	the	psychology	of	creators	of	art,	and	so	can	be	challenged	from	the	point	of	
view	 of	 art-making	 and	 not	 only	 art-viewing.	 As	 a	 preview:	what	 is	 salient	 (broadly:	
attention-grabbing)	in	one’s	perceptual	experience	on	a	given	occasion	is	a	function	of	
one’s	 interests,	 values,	 desires,	 expectations	 and	 beliefs	 at	 that	 time.	 Crucially,	 I	 shall	
argue	that	aesthetic	qualities	may	be	experienced	by	artists	as	salient	not	merely	in	the	
sense	 of	 being	 attention-grabbing,	 but	 also	 as	mandating	 action	 as	 part	 of	 an	 artistic	
response	 to	 those	 qualities.	 Beauty	 moves	 us,	 not	 necessarily	 to	 tears	 or	 rapt	
contemplation,	but	to	practical	action.	Beauty	may	inspire	deeds,	and	it	may	do	so	as	part	
and	parcel	of	its	appreciation.	Or	so	I	shall	argue.	To	help	fix	ideas,	I	focus	on	the	art	of	
photography,	 though	 I	 believe	 similar	 claims	 would	 hold	 for	 other	 art	 forms,	 e.g.,	
poetry/literature,	music	and	painting,	though	no	doubt	the	details	would	need	handling	
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differently.	In	addition,	I	will	argue	that	a	virtue-based	approach	to	aesthetics	supplies	a	
useful	background	against	which	to	address	these	matters	 insofar	as	the	 link	between	
salience	and	interests	is	suggestive	of	a	link	between	salience	and	character,	one	that	has	
already	been	explored	fruitfully	in	the	moral	domain	(Chappell	&	Yetter-Chappell	2016).		
	
	
II. Art-Making	vs	Disinterest?	
Theories	of	Kantian	disinterest	are	unduly	spectator-based	in	their	analysis	of	aesthetic	
judgement.	 That	 will	 be	 the	 take-home	 message.	 By	 attempting	 to	 divorce	 aesthetic	
judgement	from	practical	action,	they	view	such	judgement	through	the	lens	of	passive	
observation,	rather	than	active	creation.	Indeed,	an	underappreciated	problem	for	such	
theories	 is	 that	 they	 rule	 out	 certain	 judgements	 on	 the	 part	 of	 artists	 as	 bona	 fide	
aesthetic.	Berys	Gaut	(2007,	p.31)	has	drawn	attention	to	this	problem.	Gaut	writes:		
	
[I]f	we	insisted	that	a	contemplative	(non-practical)	attitude	is	necessary	for	an	
attitude’s	being	aesthetic,	then	any	artist	at	all	would	count	as	not	taking	up	an	
aesthetic	attitude	to	her	work	while	making	it.	For	her	attitude	towards	her	work	
is	certainly	practical	while	she	makes	it:	she	is	concerned	to	create	it	and	to	revise	
it	in	various	ways	so	as	to	improve	its	quality.	The	contemplative	criterion	for	the	
aesthetic	attitude	here	reveals	itself	as	rooted	in	the	audience’s	perspective	on	the	
artwork	and	neglects	the	viewpoint	of	its	maker,	which	has	at	least	as	good	a	claim	
to	be	an	aesthetic	one	as	does	the	audience’s.		
	
	
Gaut’s	idea	is	that	at	least	two	things	are	true	of	artists,	when	they	create	their	works:	(i)	
they	make	aesthetic	 judgements	about	 those	works	and	(ii)	such	 judgement	are	made	
from	 a	 practical	 point	 of	 view;	 they	 are	 not	 made	 from	 a	 passive,	 disinterested	
perspective	 of	 calm	 contemplation,	 but	 from	 an	 interested	 perspective	 as	 to	whether	
certain	actions	need	performing,	i.e.	on	the	work	currently	being	created.	For	instance,	
producing	a	still	life,	a	painter	may	pause	to	judge	the	composition	not	dispassionately,	
but	by	way	of	deciding	if	further	work	is	necessary	and	where.	Finding	the	composition	
only	 somewhat	 balanced,	 they	 may	 be	 further	 prompted	 to	 judge	 whether	 the	
proportions	are	quite	right	and	whether	the	colour	scheme	needs	rethinking.	The	ensuing	
aesthetic	judgements	are	practical	in	character,	having	a	conceptual	connection	to	action:	
the	proportions	are	off	a	tad	and	require	retouching;	a	darker	shade	of	red	would	better	
accentuate	 the	contrast	between	 the	objects;	 etc.	Thus,	 artists’	 aesthetic	 judgement	of	
their	works	pose	a	counterexample	to	Kantian	disinterest.	
	
No	doubt	artists	are	interested	in	modifying	their	works	on	the	basis	of	their	aesthetic	
judgements.	But	whether	there	is	a	compelling	challenge	here	to	Kantian	disinterest	is	
less	clear.	Defenders	of	Kantian	disinterest	can	reasonably	attempt	to	separate	in	these	
cases	the	artist’s	aesthetic	judgement	from	the	artist’s	interests.	For	in	reaching	a	verdict	
on	whether	their	work	requires	modification,	the	artist	may	consider	the	work	from	the	
point	 of	 view	 of	 a	 dispassionate	 spectator,	 thereby	 flipping	 between	 interested	 and	
disinterested	perspectives	and	keeping	the	two	separate.	The	(dis)pleasure	taken	by	the	
painter	 in	 their	 composition	 need	 not	 be	 (dis)pleasure	 that	 is	 grounded	 in	 their	
idiosyncratic	interests,	e.g.,	to	refine	the	work	or	make	it	better	fit	the	vision	they	initially	
had	in	mind.	That	is,	the	interest	and	the	(dis)pleasure	need	not	in	fact	“mix”	(§2)	in	the	
way	that	Kant	thought	problematic.	Only	if	the	(dis)pleasure	in	the	object	of	creation	is	
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partially	 constituted	 (or	 grounded,	 etc.)	 in	 the	 artist’s	 idiosyncratic	 interests,	 while	
remaining	 intuitively	 aesthetic,	 will	 Kantian	 disinterest	 be	 challenged.	 But	 as	 the	
possibility	 of	 switching	 between	 disinterested/interested	 perspectives	 and	 thereby	
keeping	them	distinct	shows,	this	way	of	understanding	the	cases	Gaut	has	in	mind	is	not	
mandatory.			
	
So,	if	Gaut	is	right	to	highlight	a	clash	between	art-making	and	Kantian	disinterest,	then	
that	clash	requires	a	much	fuller	defence.	This	is	the	aim	I	set	myself	in	this	paper.	I	shall	
attempt	 to	 elucidate	 the	 tension	 between	 art-making	 and	 Kantian	 disinterest	 by	
considering	the	art	of	photography	and	works	by	one	of	its	great	masters:	Henri	Cartier-
Bresson.	 But	 to	 do	 so	will	 first	 require	 detours	 via	 the	 concepts	 of	 both	 salience	 and	
virtue.	
	
	
III. Salience	
Philosophical	discussions	of	the	concept	of	‘salience’	are	few,	but	where	they	are	found,	
they	typically	take	their	lead	from	a	body	of	literature	in	perceptual	psychology	on	the	
mechanisms	of	perceptual	attention	(Wu	2014;	Chappell	&	Yetter-Chappell	2016;	Watzl	
2017;	though	see	Greco	2003	and	Lackey	2007	for	discussion	of	‘explanatory	salience’).	
By	and	large,	discussion	of	what	is	salient	for	an	agent	is	bound	up,	either	implicitly	or	
explicitly,	 with	 discussion	 of	 how	 perceptual	 attention	 alights	 on	 a	 region,	 object	 or	
feature	 in	 a	 non-involuntary,	 automatic	 way	 (sometimes	 called	 ‘exogenous’	 or	
‘exogenously-driven’	 attention).	 This	 aligns	 with	 a	 very	 natural	 reading	 of	 the	 term	
‘salient’	as	referring	 to	 that	which	 is	attention-grabbing.	Things	 that	are	salient	 for	an	
agent	are	things	which	capture,	divert	or	take	command	of	 the	agent’s	attention.	Such	
involuntary	 shifts	of	perceptual	 attention	will	 be	my	 focus	and	 contrast	with	 shifts	of	
spatial-,	 object-	 or	 feature-based	 attention	 that	 occur	 intentionally	 (sometimes	 called	
‘endogenous’	or	‘endogenously-driven’	attention).		
	
First	point:	involuntary	shifts	of	attention,	while	automatic	and	unwilled,	are	still	causally	
responsive	to	idiosyncratic	aspects	of	the	agent’s	psychology	(for	some	exceptions,	see	
Wu	 2014,	 pp.37-38).	 A	 crying	 voice	may	 automatically	 draw	 attention	 your	 auditory	
attention	 away	 from	 a	 conversation	 only	 because	 you	 recognise	 the	 voice	 to	 be	 your	
child’s.	 A	water	 cooler	may	 draw	 your	 visual	 attention	 only	 because	 you	 are	 thirsty.	
Focusing	 on	 the	 conversation,	 you	 weren’t	 listening	 out	 for	 your	 child’s	 voice.	 Not	
believing	a	water	cooler	to	be	located	in	the	building,	you	weren’t	looking	for	one.	Rather,	
these	things	struck	you.	They	were	salient	for	you,	exerting	an	involuntary	tug	on	your	
attention,	but	only	given	your	particular	background	beliefs,	desires,	interests,	etc.		
	
An	example	 from	beyond	 the	armchair:	 in	 experimental	 conditions,	Yi	 Jiang	and	 their	
colleagues	 (2006)	 found	 that	 erotic	 pictures	 either	 involuntarily	 capture	 or	 repel	
subjects’	 spatial	 attention,	dependent	on	 the	 sex	and	sexual	orientation	of	 the	 subject	
participant:	 the	attention	of	heterosexual	males	was	 involuntarily	 captured	by	 female	
nudes	yet	repelled	by	male	nudes,	while	heterosexual	females’	and	gay	males’	attention	
was	involuntarily	grabbed	by	male	nudes	(though	not	repelled	by	female	nudes	in	quite	
the	same	manner).	Similar	patterns	of	attentional	repulsion/capture	were	observed	for	
bi-sexual	and	gay	females.		
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A	 second	 point:	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 what	 an	 agent	 finds	 salient	 is	 a	 product	 of	 their	
particular	psychology,	salience	patterns	can	imply	facts	about	character.	For	instance,	we	
may	find	others	morally	blameworthy	to	the	extent	that	certain	morally-relevant	facts	
are	 not	 salient	 to	 them.	 Failing	 to	 have	 one’s	 attention	 diverted	 by	 the	 surrounding	
poverty	 when	 visiting	 an	 exotic	 holiday	 destination	 seems	 to	 imply	 obliviousness	 to	
others’	needs.	But	we	also	find	people	morally	blameworthy	to	the	extent	that	certain	
morally-relevant	facts	are	salient	to	them,	exerting	a	pull	on	their	attention,	and	yet	fail	
to	provide	any	motivational	 influence.	Having	one’s	attention	grabbed	by	the	sound	of	
one’s	child	calling	out	in	pain,	but	without	being	moved	to	check	on	the	child,	implies	at	
best	pitilessness	and	at	worst	malevolence.	As	Chappell	&	Yetter-Chappell	put	it	(2016,	
p.452):	“In	cases	where	the	needs	of	others	are	especially	salient	to	an	agent,	any	altruistic	
desires	in	that	agent	can	be	expected	to	function	at	full	efficacy.”	Such	an	expectation	is	
normative	in	character	and	not	merely	causal.		
	
A	third	point:	one	way	to	understand	episodes	of	perceptual	salience,	as	a	form	of	non-
voluntary	 attention-grabbingness,	 is	 that	 they	 involve	 an	 experience	 of	 the	 world	 as	
attempting	to	solicit	a	response	from	you.	Susanna	Siegel	(2014,	pp.55-56)	distinguishes	
among	such	soliciting	experiences	ones	in	which	attention	is	grabbed	by	a	stimulus	and	
the	agent	fails	to	be	moved	by	the	solicitation,	from	cases	where	motivation	to	do	what	is	
solicited	 is	 present.	 Siegel	 calls	 the	 latter	 cases	 ones	 of	 “experienced	mandates.”	 For	
hopefully	very	many	parents,	hearing	their	child	crying	in	pain	involves	an	experienced	
mandate	and	is	not	a	mere	soliciting	experience:	the	child	sounds	as	if	it	is	to-be-checked-
on	 and	 the	 parent	 feels	 compelled	 to	 do	 so.	 Siegel	 (Ibid.,	 p52)	 characterises	 the	
phenomenology	 of	 experienced	 mandates	 as	 follows:	 “From	 your	 point	 of	 view,	 the	
environment	pulls	actions	out	of	you	directly,	like	a	force	moving	a	situation,	with	your	
actions	in	it,	from	one	moment	to	the	next.”		
	
I	will	mark	this	distinction	of	Siegel’s	by	talking	of	experiences	where	a	stimulus	is	weakly	
salient,	 in	contrast	with	experiences	in	which	a	stimulus	is	strongly	salient.	The	parent	
whose	attention	is	grabbed	by	the	sound	of	their	crying	child,	but	is	not	moved	to	check	
on	its	wellbeing,	has	a	weakly	salient	experience	of	their	crying	child.	The	parent	whose	
attention	is	grabbed	by	that	sound	and,	in	hearing	it,	is	motivated	to	check	on	the	child	
has	a	strongly	salient	experience	of	their	crying	child.	The	first	is	a	blameworthy	agent.	
The	second	is	intuitively	more	admirable.		
	
Now,	 theories	 of	 Kantian	 disinterest	 claim	 that	 aesthetic	 judgements	 of,	 e.g.,	 beauty,	
elegance,	harmony,	proportion,	unity,	etc.	are	partially	constituted	by	a	contemplative	
experience	in	which	one	sheds	one’s	idiosyncratic	interests	and	is	perceptually	absorbed	
in	 an	 object’s	 appearance	 for	 its	 own	 sake,	 absent	 practical	 concerns.	 Insofar	 as	
attributions	 of	 strongly	 salient	 experiences	 imply	 both	 idiosyncratic	 interests	 of	 the	
agent,	combined	with	motivational	elements,	Kantian	disinterest	entails	that	there	can	be	
no	strongly	salient	aesthetic	experiences	of,	e.g.,	beauty,	elegance,	harmony,	proportion,	
unity,	 etc.	 A	 strongly	 salient	 aesthetic	 experience	 is	 had	 by	 an	 agent	 just	 in	 case	 they	
experience	an	object	to	be,	e.g.,	beautiful,	elegant,	harmonious,	proportioned,	unified,	etc.	
in	 an	 attention-grabbing	way	 that	 implicates	 one	 or	more	 idiosyncratic	 psychological	
features	of	that	agent	and	where	a	high	degree	of	motivation	to	act	on	that	experience	is	
present.	Such	experiences,	of	beauty	and	other	aesthetic	qualities,	are	conceptually	tied	
to	 the	 agent	 and	 their	 peculiar	 interests	 in	 ways	 that	 Kantian	 disinterest	 says	 is	
incompatible	 with	 them	 being	 bona	 fide	 aesthetic	 in	 character.	 Yet	 strongly	 salient	
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aesthetic	experiences	are	not	only	possible,	but	are	plausibly	attributed	to	aesthetically	
virtuous	artists,	photographers	in	particular.		
	
	
IV. Virtue	Aesthetics	
In	philosophical	aesthetics,	the	locus	of	aesthetic	evaluation	has	traditionally	been	taken	
to	be	objects.	A	shift	away	from	this	tradition	has	occurred	in	the	shape	of	virtue-based	
approaches	to	aesthetics.	Like	virtue-based	approaches	in	ethics	and	epistemology,	these	
aim	 to	 direct	 evaluative	 focus	 onto	 agents,	 with	 emphasis	 on	 the	 skills,	 emotions,	
character	 traits,	 motives	 and	 intentions	 that	 manifest	 in	 artistic	 activity,	 where	 this	
includes	the	appreciation,	performance	and	creation	of	works	of	art.	
	
This	approach	has	been	developed	in	a	number	of	ways	(see	Woodruff	2001;	Goldie	2007;	
Lopes	2008;	Kieran	2009;	Ransom	2019).	My	focus	will	be	the	distinction	drawn	by	Tom	
Roberts	 (2018)	 between	 faculty	 and	 trait	 aesthetic	 virtues,	 principally	 in	 relation	 to	
artistic	creation.	This	distinction	takes	inspiration	from	a	familiar	one	in	epistemology	at	
the	heart	of	the	dispute	between	reliabilism	and	responsibilism.	According	to	reliabilism,	
intellectual	virtue	 is	constituted	by	mere	 faculties	of	 the	agent:	a	good	memory,	 finely	
detailed	powers	of	perception,	keen	powers	of	inference	and	reasoning,	etc.	(Sosa	2007)	
According	 to	 responsibilism,	 intellectual	 virtue	 is	 constituted	by	 aspects	 of	 an	 agent’s	
character:	 traits	 of	 open-mindedness,	 adaptability,	 carefulness,	 humility,	 fairness,	 etc.	
(Zagzebski	1996)		
	
Roberts	 notes	 that	 we	 can,	 accordingly,	 consider	 aesthetic	 virtues	 of	 creation	 to	 be	
constituted	by	faculties,	e.g.,	perfect	pitch,	a	steady	hand,	a	sense	of	harmony	and	rhythm,	
an	eye	for	detail,	a	vivid	imagination,	a	rich	vocabulary	etc.	or	by	traits,	e.g.,	that	reflect	a	
concern	for	the	aesthetic,	 including	the	courage	to	push	boundaries,	receptivity	to	and	
open-mindedness	about	novel	sources	of	aesthetic	value,	and	a	concern	for	honesty	and	
authenticity	in	the	expressive	or	representational	properties	of	one’s	works.		
	
Artworks	that	are	the	product	of	aesthetic	faculty	virtues	instantiate	achievement	value,	
according	 to	Roberts.	 For	 instance,	hyperreaslistic	portraits	by	Chuck	Close	are	 finely	
executed,	requiring	a	keen	eye	for	detail	and	refined	motor-skills.	The	song	“Parakeet”	by	
the	 band	 Faraquet	 is	 complex	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 individual	 riffs	 and	 its	 changes	 in	 time	
signature,	requiring	a	dexterous	memory	to	switch	between	such	changes.		
	
Trait	aesthetic	virtues,	by	contrast,	are	ones	that	the	agent	is	more	fully	responsible	for	
and	constitute	more	deeply	who	the	agent	 is	as	a	person.	Chiefly,	 this	 is	 through	such	
virtues	revealing	core	concerns,	values	and	principles	to	which	the	agent	is	evaluatively	
committed.	 Attributions	 of	 these	 aesthetic	 virtues	 thus	 imply	 facts	 about	 the	 agent’s	
motives	 in	 ways	 that	 attributions	 of	 mere	 faculty	 virtues	 do	 not.	 Such	 works	 have,	
according	 to	 Roberts,	 motivational	 value.	 The	 chief	 idea	 is	 that	 artworks	 can	 be	
aesthetically	evaluated	not	simply	for	their	intrinsic	formal	qualities,	nor	for	how	they	
are	 the	 product	 of	 an	 agent’s	 remarkable	 aesthetic	 faculties	 or	 skills,	 but	 for	 being	
“shaped	 and	 crafted	 according	 to	what	 she	 cares	 about.”	 (Ibid.,	 p.	 443)	 Denis	 Dutton	
makes	a	similar	point	in	discussion	of	the	concept	‘authenticity’	in	art:	
	
It	is	more	than	just	formal	quality	that	distinguishes	the	latest	multimillion-dollar	
Hollywood	 sex-and-violence	 blockbuster	 or	 manipulative	 tearjerker	 from	 the	
	 7	
dark	depths	of	the	Beethoven	Opus	131	String	Quartet	or	the	passionate	intensity	
of	The	Brothers	Karamazov.	These	latter	are	meant	in	a	way	that	many	examples	
of	 the	 former	 cannot	 possibly	 be:	 they	 embody	 an	 element	 of	 personal	
commitment	normally	missing	from	much	popular	entertainment	art	and	virtually	
all	commercial	advertising.	(2003,	p.271)	
	
	
The	concept	of	aesthetic	trait	virtues	dovetails	neatly	with	the	concept	of	strongly	salient	
aesthetic	experiences.	Recall:	a	strongly	salient	aesthetic	experience	is	had	by	an	agent	
just	 in	 case	 they	 experience	 an	 object	 to	 be,	 e.g.,	 beautiful,	 elegant,	 harmonious,	
proportioned,	 unified,	 etc.	 in	 an	 attention-grabbing	 way	 that	 implicates	 one	 or	more	
idiosyncratic	psychological	features	of	the	agent	and	where	a	high-degree	of	motivation	
to	 act	 on	 that	 experience	 is	 present.	 For	what	 an	 agent	 finds	 strongly	 salient	 in	 this	
aesthetic	sense	likewise	reflects	the	agent’s	concerns,	values	and	interests.		
	
We	saw	in	discussion	of	the	parent	who	has	a	strongly	salient	experience	of	their	crying	
child	that	they	are	morally	admirable,	to	some	extent,	for	being	motivated	to	check	on	its	
wellbeing.	The	parent	who	is	not	so	motivated,	and	who	has	a	weakly	salient	experience	
of	their	crying	child,	is	morally	blameworthy.	(Caution:	do	not	think	that	all	weakly	salient	
experiences	entail	a	deficit	of	virtue,	nor	that	all	strongly	salient	experiences	entail	 its	
possession.	 Some	 attributions	 of	 strongly	 salient	 experiences,	 where	 an	 agent	 is	
motivated	to	act	maliciously,	entail	viciousness	and	some	attributions	of	weakly	salient	
experiences	entail	commendable	restraint.)		
	
Likewise,	I	suggest,	artists	are	sometimes	aesthetically	admired	for	their	strongly	salient	
aesthetic	experiences;	that	is,	for	having	their	attention	grabbed	by	a	stimulus	and	being	
motivated	 to	 produce	works	 of	 art	 as	 a	 result.	When	 artists	 are	 so	 admired,	 they	 are	
thereby	 admired	 for	 their	 trait	 aesthetic	 virtues,	 aesthetic	 virtues	 that,	 unlike	 mere	
faculty	virtues,	imply	motivational	facts:	that	the	artist	was	moved	to	produce	that.	To	
make	 this	 idea	 concrete,	 I	 now	 turn	 to	 photography,	 first	 discussing	 its	 relation	 to	
aesthetic	 faculty	 virtues	 before	 moving	 on	 to	 the	 manifestation	 in	 photography	 of	
aesthetic	trait	virtues.		
	
	
V.		 The	Photographer’s	Eye	
Consider	talk	of	‘the	photographer’s	eye’	or	of	someone’s	having	‘a	photographer’s	eye.’	
These	are	terms	of	praise	for	an	agent	for	having	a	relatively	unique	way	of	seeing	the	
world,	 one	 that	 is	 manifest	 in	 their	 photographs.	 It	 might	 be	 thought	 that	 to	 have	 a	
photographer’s	eye	is	merely	to	possess	certain	aesthetic	faculty	virtues,	e.g.,	to	visually	
discern	spatial	forms	or	to	imagine	how	a	3-D	scene	will	appear	in	the	2-D	surface	of	the	
resulting	photograph,	 etc.	We	 can	 also	 add	here	 the	practical	 skills	 to	 knowledgeably	
control	certain	variables,	like	shutter	speed,	focal	length	and	lighting	conditions.	Consider	
as	well	how	an	agent	with	a	photographer’s	eye	may	perceptually	categorise	objects	in	
such	 a	 way	 that	 entails	 awareness	 of	 those	 objects’	 typical	 temporal	 dynamics,	 thus	
enabling	such	objects	to	be	tracked	through	the	viewfinder	(Maynard	2008,	p.203).	This	
latter	skill	is	especially	important	for	capturing	the	scene	in	its	full	dynamics,	what	Henri	
Cartier-Bresson	famously	called	‘the	decisive	moment.’		
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Cartier-Bresson’s	writings	are	a	rich	source	of	reflection	on	the	nature	of	photography.	
Some	of	these	seem	to	describe	the	act	of	photographing	from	the	perspective	of	aesthetic	
faculty	virtues.	Consider	the	following:		
	
[P]hotography	 is	 the	simultaneous	recognition,	 in	a	 fraction	of	a	 second,	of	 the	
significance	of	an	event	as	well	as	of	a	precise	organization	of	forms	which	give	
that	event	its	proper	expression.	(2004,	p.42)	
	
Sometimes	 it	 happens	 that	 you	 stall,	 delay,	 wait	 for	 something	 to	 happen.	
Sometimes	you	have	the	feeling	that	here	are	all	the	makings	of	a	picture—except	
for	just	one	thing	that	seems	to	be	missing.	But	what	one	thing?	Perhaps	someone	
suddenly	 walks	 into	 your	 range	 of	 view.	 You	 follow	 his	 progress	 through	 the	
viewfinder.	You	wait	and	wait,	and	then	finally	you	press	the	button.	(Ibid.,	p.33)	
	
After	developing	and	printing,	you	must	go	about	separating	the	pictures	which,	
though	they	are	all	right,	aren’t	the	strongest.	When	it’s	too	late,	then	you	know	
with	a	terrible	clarity	exactly	where	you	failed…	Was	it	simply	that	you	did	not	
take	into	account	a	certain	detail	in	relation	to	the	whole	setup?	Or	was	it	(and	this	
is	more	frequent)	that	your	glance	became	vague,	your	eye	wandered	off	(Ibid.,	
pp.25-7)	
	
Memory	 is	 very	 important,	 particularly	 in	 respect	 to	 the	 recollection	 of	 every	
picture	you’ve	taken	while	you’ve	been	galloping	at	the	speed	of	the	scene	itself.	
The	photographer	must	make	sure,	while	he	is	still	in	the	presence	of	the	unfolding	
scene,	 that	 he	 hasn’t	 left	 any	 gaps,	 that	 he	 has	 really	 given	 expression	 to	 the	
meaning	of	the	scene	in	its	entirety,	for	afterwards	it	is	too	late.	He	is	never	able	
to	wind	the	scene	backwards	in	order	to	photograph	it	all	over	again.	(Ibid.,	p.25)	
	
[Photography]	requires	concentration,	a	discipline	of	mind,	sensitivity	and	a	sense	
of	geometry.	(Ibid.,	p.15)	
	
	
For	Cartier-Bresson,	the	photographer’s	eye	involves	a	kind	of	flexibility	of	seeing,	quick	
reactions,	a	keen	memory,	and,	above	all,	a	sense	of	space	and	form.	Looking	at	some	of	
Cartier-Bresson’s	best-known	works	of	winding	streets	and	alleys	there	can	be	no	doubt	
that	he	is,	as	Gérard	Macé	(1996,	p.11)	put	it,	“a	geometrician	without	a	sliderule.”	(See	
Cartier-Bresson’s	 Aquila	 degli	 Abruzzi;	 Sifnos,	 Greece;	 and	 Hyères,	 France.)	 Indeed,	
Cartier-Bresson’s	 photographs	 merit	 admiration	 not	 just	 for	 their	 striking	 formal	
features,	but	for	the	achievement	involved	in	skilfully	capturing	such	fleeting	geometrical	
patterns;	Cartier-Bresson’s	photographs	are	not	merely	 formally	 interesting,	but	well-
timed	(Cavedon-Taylor	2020).	
	
But	there	is	another	strand	in	these,	and	other	writings,	of	Cartier-Bresson	and	that	point	
to	the	importance	he	placed	on	aesthetic	trait	virtues	and	the	motivational	value	that	may	
be	possessed	by	the	resulting	photographs.	Indeed,	talk	of	‘the	photographer’s	eye’	can	
attribute	not	only	certain	remarkable	 faculties	or	skills.	 It	can	 implicate	aspects	of	 the	
photographer’s	character,	their	concerns	and	motivation.	Talk	of	‘the	photographer’s	eye’	
is	 thus	 not	 always	 talk	 about	 a	 skill-based	 type,	 but	 something	 more	 trope-like:	 a	
particular,	unrepeatable	way	of	seeing	the	world.	Cartier-Bresson’s	photographer’s	eye,	
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for	 instance,	 is	 not	 that	 of	Nan	Goldin’s	 or	Ansel	 Adams’s.	 Some	photographs	 are	 the	
product	of	agents	who	see	 the	world	 in	playful,	absurd	or	 ironic	ways.	Others	are	 the	
product	of	agents	who	see	things	more	seriously.		
	
The	photographic	eye	of	Cartier-Bresson	was	a	humanistic	one.	The	above	remarks	are	
made	by	someone	with	patience	for,	and	open-mindedness	to,	the	beauty	of	human	life.	
Crucially,	 they	express	Cartier-Bresson’s	 concern	 to	 faithfully	 record	 the	 intricacies	of	
human,	lived	experience,	with	all	of	its	details,	both	messy	and	minute.	Cartier-Bresson,	
in	his	own	words,	sought	to	accept	humanity	“in	all	 its	reality”,	reporting	that	his	aim,	
above	all	else,	was	“to	be	attentive	to	life.”	(2004,	p.66.)	On	visiting	Moscow,	he	revealed	
his	particular	aesthetic	concerns	as	following:	“I	explained	that	my	main	interest	was	in	
people	and	that	I	would	like	to	see	them	in	streets,	 in	shops,	at	work,	at	play,	in	every	
visible	aspect	of	daily	life.”	Cartier-Bresson’s	photographs	of	crowds	and	persons	appear	
evidence	of	his	finding	beauty	in	fleeting	moments	of	ordinary	life.	(See	his	Boy	Carrying	
a	Wine	Bottle;	portrait	of	Alberto	Giacometti;	On	the	Banks	of	the	Marne.)	As	E.H.	Gombrich	
(1978,	 p.10)	 writes,	 Cartier-Bresson’s	 photographs	 “will	 make	 us	 look	 at	 people	 and	
situations	anywhere	with	a	heightened	sense	of	sympathy	and	compassion.	He	is	a	true	
humanist.”		
	
So,	 Cartier-Bresson	 thus	 possessed	 a	 photographer’s	 eye	 that	 was	 not	 merely	
geometrically	 exacting,	 but	 also	 deeply	 humane.	 Accordingly,	 his	 photographs	 merit	
admiration,	among	other	reasons,	insofar	as	they	were	produced	from	the	aesthetically	
virtuous	motivations	of	open-mindedness	to,	and	patience	with,	a	certain	kind	of	beauty:	
that	of	human	life.	Again	in	his	own	words:	“In	photography,	the	smallest	thing	can	be	a	
great	subject.	The	little,	human	detail	can	become	a	leitmotiv.”	(2004,	p.29)		
	
Here,	 then,	 is	 the	key	claim:	examining	Cartier-Bresson’s	photographs	and	reading	his	
thoughts	on	photography,	it	is	natural	to	think	that	human	life	was	strongly	aesthetically	
salient	for	him.	That	is,	the	aesthetic	aspects	of	everyday	life	did	not	take	command	of	his	
attention,	 yet	 leave	 him	 unmoved;	 that	 would	 be	 to	 attribute	 mere	 weakly	 salient	
aesthetic	experience	of	human	life.	Rather,	it	is	plausible	that	he	found	beauty,	serenity,	
and	other	aesthetic	qualities	in	small	details	of	human	life	in	an	attention-grabbing	way	
that	 entailed	 a	 desire	 to	 faithfully	 and	 sympathetically	 record	 such	 details	 with	 his	
camera.	For	Cartier-Bresson,	the	beauty	of	human	life	may	have	been	salient	in	the	sense	
that	 it	simultaneously	called	out	 to	be	photographed	and	moved	him	accordingly.	The	
environment	may	have	seemed	to	pull	the	act	of	photographing	out	of	him	directly,	in	the	
manner	described	by	Siegel.	So	much	the	worse	for	theories	of	Kantian	disinterest,	since	
they	 analyse	 aesthetic	 judgement	 as	 necessarily	 free	 from	 personal	 concerns	 and	
practical	action.		
	
How	far	can	these	remarks	be	generalised?	I	suspect	that	they	can	be	generalised	quite	
widely,	among	both	amateur	and	professional	photographers.	It	is	very	natural	to	think	
that	people	are	moved	to	take	photographs	of	people,	places	and	events	because	they	find	
those	 people,	 places	 and	 events	 to	 be	 objects	 of	 aesthetic	 interest.	 A	 tourist	 may	 be	
concerned	to	capture	the	breath-taking	beauty	of	their	surroundings	and,	as	a	result,	have	
their	attention	grabbed	by	 the	magnificence	of	particular	natural	 scenes	and	vistas	 in	
such	a	way	 that	 these	may,	phenomenologically,	 call	 out	 to	be	photographed,	 thereby	
moving	the	tourist	accordingly.	A	doting	grandparent	at	their	grandchild’s	nativity	play	
may	be	unable	to	divert	their	eyes	from	their	grandchild,	due	to	their	love	for	the	child,	
	 10	
feeling	compelled	 to	snap	away	on	 their	phone	as	a	 result.	Both	count	as	 instances	of	
strongly	salient	aesthetic	experience.	Photography	is	a	case	where	beauty	may	at	once	
grab	 and	move.	 For	 an	 aesthetically	 virtuous	 photographer,	 like	 Cartier-Bresson,	 the	
appreciation	of	beauty	is	experience	of	a	photo	opportunity,	making	judgements	of	beauty	
and	motivation	to	act	entwined	for	them.	
	
Now,	these	examples,	including	that	of	Cartier-Bresson,	might	be	construed	in	a	causal	
way	that	does	not	threaten	Kantian	disinterest.	On	the	causal	picture,	the	photographer’s	
appreciation	and	judgement	of	the	objects	before	them	is	one	thing,	their	being	moved	to	
photograph	 those	objects	 remains	quite	 another.	The	disinterested	 judgement	merely	
causes	a	motivation	to	act.	Indeed,	recall	the	earlier	worry	about	Gaut’s	way	of	motivating	
a	 clash	 between	 Kantian	 disinterestedness	 and	 art-making	 by	 focussing	 on	 artists’	
judgements	of	their	works.	The	worry	was	that	while	the	artist	may	appear	to	be	taking	
an	interested,	practical	stance	when	judging	their	work	aesthetically,	as	Gaut	suggests,	
she	may	in	fact	be	flipping	between	interested	and	disinterested	stances,	again	keeping	
the	two	distinct.	
	
So,	we	have	two	potential	responses	on	the	part	of	the	defender	of	Kantian	disinterest	to	
consider.	 First,	 the	 photographer’s	 appreciation	 of	 a	 scene	 and	 their	 motivation	 to	
photograph	it	may	be	connected,	but	only	causally.	Second,	the	two	may	not	be	connected	
at	all;	the	photographer	may	simply	switch	at	will	between	disinterested	and	interested	
attitudes.		
	
The	problem	with	these	responses	is	in	how	they	separate	aesthetic	judgement	of	O	from	
the	 motivation	 to	 photograph	 O.	 Take	 the	 first	 response.	 Since	 it	 says	 the	 two	 are	
connected	causally,	this	would	entail	that	the	photographer’s	aesthetic	judgement	of	O	
and	their	motivation	to	photograph	O	can	be	understood	in	isolation	from	one	another.	
The	 second	 response	 broadly	 agrees	 on	 this	 matter.	 For	 it	 denies	 that	 there	 is	 any	
connection	per	 se	 between	 the	photographer’s	 aesthetic	 appraisal	 of	 the	 scene	before	
them	and	their	motivation	to	photograph	that	scene;	instead,	a	higher-order	state	in	the	
photographer	is	responsible	for	voluntarily	switching	between	the	two.	
	
Are	 either	 views	 plausible?	 The	 key	 worry	 is	 that	 there	 appears	 little	 that	 can	 be	
understood	of	the	motivation	to	photograph	O,	if	fully	characterisable	in	abstraction	from	
an	aesthetic	judgement	of	O’s	qualities,	something	that	both	responses	claim	is	the	case.	
For	how	are	we	to	understand	a	subject’s	being	motivated	at	t1	to	photograph	O,	with	
aesthetic	judgement	of	O	at	t1	potentially	absent?	Where	no	aesthetic	judgement	of	O	is	
present,	 motivation	 to	 photograph	 O	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 not	 be	 present	 as	 well.	
Construing	 the	 connection	between	 the	photographer’s	 aesthetic	 judgement	and	 their	
motivation	to	photograph	either	as	a	mere	causal	one,	as	the	first	response	does,	or	as	
not	connected	at	all,	as	the	second	does,	fails	to	give	a	plausible	account	of	the	strength	of	
connection	 between	 the	 two.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 aesthetically	 virtuous	 photographers,	 like	
Cartier-Bresson,	motivation	to	photograph	seems	closer	to	a	criterion	for	the	attribution	
of	aesthetic	judgement,	rather	than	something	that	is	at	best	connected	contingently,	i.e.	
via	causation.		
	
	
VI.		 Broader	Concerns	
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In	 claiming	 that	 (some	 of)	 the	 experiences	 of	 (some)	 photographers	 are	 fully	 salient	
aesthetic	experiences,	there	is	one	respect	in	which	I	wish	to	depart	from	Siegel.	Recall	
that	 Siegel	 calls	 the	more	 general	 type	 of	 experience	here,	 a	 felt	 solicitation	 from	 the	
world	with	accompanying	motivational	elements,	an	experienced	mandate.	What	I	wish	
to	dispute	is	Siegel’s	claim	that	the	object	of	such	experiences	are	never	represented	as	
“a	source	of	normative	constraint.”	(2014,	p.46)	Siegel’s	idea	appears	to	be	that	in	feeling	
oneself	 answerable	 to	 the	 world	 in	 these	 experiences	 one	 does	 not	 simultaneously	
experience	oneself	to	be	under	pressure	or	requirement	to	act	in	the	relevant	way.	Siegel	
claims	that	this	contrasts	with	how	one	may	feel	oneself,	for	whatever	reason,	answerable	
to	another	person.		
	
Given	the	connection	between	salience	and	character,	I	think	that	this	last	claim	is	to	be	
resisted.	 (Recall	 that	 having	 one’s	 attention	 grabbed	 by	 a	 stimulus,	 in	 either	 weakly	
salient	or	strongly	salient	experiences,	aesthetic	or	otherwise,	implies	psychological	facts	
about	one’s	interests	and	concerns.)	The	parent	whose	attention	is	grabbed	by	the	sound	
of	their	crying	child	and	is	motivated	to	check	on	their	wellbeing	may	well	experience	a	
“normative	constraint”	on	the	action	of	checking:	it	is	experienced	as	to	be	done,	morally.	
Similarly,	given	what	we	know	about	Cartier-Bresson’s	character	via	his	photographs	and	
writings,	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 he	 experienced	 a	 normative	 constraint	 on	 the	 action	 of	
photographing	human	life,	that	photographing	human	beauty	is	the	thing	to	be	done,	from	
the	point	of	view	of	the	aesthetic.	Human	beauty	may	have	been	experienced	as	requiring	
faithful	documentation.	Thus,	an	agent	in	either	the	ethical	or	aesthetic	cases	described,	
who	 is	 motivated	 to	 act	 but,	 for	 whatever	 reason	 does	 not,	 may	 well	 experience	
themselves	 as	 having	 failed	 to	 live	 up	 to	 normative	 demands.	 Inaction	 may	 be	
experienced	as	the	wrong	thing	to	have	done.	Regret	and	self-reproach	may	ensue.		
	
These	two	cases	are	individually	sufficient	to	put	pressure	on	Siegel’s	claim	that	strongly	
salient	 experiences/experienced	 mandates	 never	 involve	 experiencing	 a	 stimulus	 as	
imposing	 a	 normative	 constraint.	 Clearly,	 the	 idea	 that	 we	 are	 subject	 to	 aesthetic	
demands	is	the	more	controversial	claim.	But	all	that	I	am	claiming	is	that	we	sometimes	
feel	that	such	constraints	are	present,	either	for	ourselves	or	others.	One	may	feel	that,	
from	the	point	of	view	of	the	aesthetic	(and	not	simply	as	a	matter	of	ethics,	prudence	or	
etiquette),	Jim	should	have	worn	a	tie,	or	that	Isabelle	ought	to	have	updated	the	décor	in	
her	flat	by	now,	or	that	a	colleague	is	much	too	old	for	that	hairstyle	(see	Archer	and	Ware	
2018	 for	more	 examples).	 Likewise,	 an	 aesthetically	 virtuous	photographer,	who	 acts	
from	care	and	concern	for	the	aesthetic,	may	feel	that	they	really	ought	to	photograph	an	
object,	whether	a	scene	in	nature	or	tender	moment	between	persons,	that	it	would	be	
an	‘aesthetic	crime’	to	leave	it	unrecorded	and	so	allow	the	photo	opportunity	to	wither	
away.	Furthermore,	such	a	photographer	may	feel	it	normatively	required	of	them	not	
merely	to	photograph	some	object,	say,	a	particular	person,	but	that,	given	the	person’s	
nature,	 aesthetic	 demands	 require	 they	 be	 photographed	 in	 a	 specific	 way,	 e.g.,	
sympathetically,	glamorously,	grittily,	etc.		
	
	
VII.		 Conclusion		
This	paper	has	many	moving	parts.	In	closing,	I’ll	attempt	to	take	stock.		
	
Theories	of	Kantian	disinterest	claim	that	aesthetic	judgement	is	partially	constituted	by	
pleasure	 in	 an	 object’s	 appearance	 that	 is	 free	 from	 the	 influence	 of	 one’s	 personal	
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interests,	 desires	 or	 values.	 Aesthetic	 judgement,	 on	 this	 view,	 is	 said	 to	 be	 a	wholly	
contemplative,	or	non-practical	psychological	state.		
	
I	have	first	claimed	that	this	view	is	incompatible	with	the	existence	of	strongly	salient	
aesthetic	experiences;	that	is,	experiences	that	form	the	basis	of	aesthetic	judgement	in	
which	an	object	is	found	to	be,	e.g.,	beautiful,	elegant,	harmonious,	proportioned,	unified,	
etc.	 in	 an	 attention-grabbing	 way	 that	 (i)	 implicates	 one	 or	 more	 idiosyncratic	
psychological	features	of	the	agent	and	(ii)	where	a	high-degree	of	motivation	to	act	on	
that	experience	is	present.	
	
Second,	 I	have	claimed	 that	we	have	good	reason	 to	 think	 that	 there	are,	 in	 fact,	 fully	
salient	 aesthetic	 experiences.	 A	 motivating	 thought	 here	 is	 that	 beauty	 sometimes	
inspires	action	rather	than	cool	observation.	Against	the	background	of	a	virtue-based	
account,	 where	 the	 character	 and	 motives	 of	 artists	 are	 aesthetically	 assessable,	 my	
example	 of	 where	 we	 may	 find	 strongly	 salient	 aesthetic	 experiences	 is	 among	 the	
experiences	of	photographers.	A	particular	case	study	is	Henri	Cartier-Bresson,	whose	
photographs	and	writings	suggest	both	an	aesthetic	interest	in	human	life	and	in	being	
motivated	to	authentically	recording	its	minutiae	as	part	of	its	appreciation.	Human	life	
appears	to	have	been	strongly	aesthetically	salient	to	him.	
	
Many	of	 these	claims,	about	Cartier-Bresson	 in	particular,	 remain	speculative.	But	 the	
idea	that	beauty,	human	or	otherwise,	may	inspire	artists	to	make	art	and	that,	second,	
artists	are	persons	who	have	unique	ways	of	seeing	the	world	(i.e.	in	which	certain	things	
are	salient	to	them	which	are	not	for	others),	are	both	familiar	ones,	however	difficult	to	
articulate	or	make	fully	precise.	If	what	I	have	said	here	is	along	the	right	lines,	then,	at	
the	very	least,	much	more	must	be	done	by	the	defender	of	Kantian	disinterest	to	show	
how	the	two	are	compatible	with	their	analysis	of	aesthetic	judgement.	
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